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Abstract Corruption may lead to tax evasion and unbalanced favors and this may lead to
extraordinary wealth amongst a few. We study for 13 countries 6 years of Forbes rankings
data and we examine whether corruption leads to more inequality amongst the wealthiest.
When we correct in our panel model for current and one-year lagged competitiveness and
GDP growth rates, we find no such effect. In fact, we find that more competitiveness
decreases inequality amongst the wealthiest.
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1 Introduction and motivation
Corruption is an important topic to study as it has been shown to affect economic growth
and inequality amongst individuals, see Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Mauro (1995,
2004) and Husted (1999) for classic general studies and Ravallion and Chen (1997), Mo
(2001), Jain (2001), Wilhelm (2002), Gyimah-Brempong (2002) and Gupta et al. (2002)
for more specific accounts. A general finding is that higher levels of corruption lead to
more inequality and more poverty, meaning lower incomes at the lower end. In the present
paper we aim to add to the knowledge base by looking only at the wealth levels at the top
end and we examine if inequality amongst the wealthiest is associated with corruption.
Income differences at the top end can be rather large, and they are worthwhile to study.
Some companies give enormous bonuses to their board members, while others follow more
restrictive guidelines. Some managers allot large amounts of stocks and options to
themselves. One could argue that a business community in a country should strive for some
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degree of equality, also from an ethical viewpoint but also from the viewpoint of the ties
that exist between various companies. Sharply differing remuneration levels will out price
certain leaders, while newer firms will never be able to afford these board members. This
raises ethical questions on the link between corruption and income inequality at the top
end. Recent research on the ethical issues in business includes Halter and Arruda (2009),
Aguilera and Vadera (2008), Bishara and Schipani (2009) and Hess (2009), and Pelletier
and Bligh (2006), (2008) and Me´on and Weill (2010), among others.
Gupta et al. (2002) and Jain (2001) argue that corruption can lead to tax evasion or
otherwise disproportionate favors to only a few. This would imply that some individuals can
become exceptionally rich. Hence, not only could corruption lead to more poverty at the
bottom end of the income spectrum, it could also lead to exceptional wealth for only a few. A
casual glance at the Forbes lists for countries like Indonesia, China and Thailand could
suggest this correlation indeed. Moreover, Neumayer (2004) and Torgler and Piatti (2009,
2013) study the number of billionaires within countries and correlates these numbers with
various variables like corruption, GDP and population size. It is found that corruption makes
the number of superrich to increase. In this paper we do not focus on the number of superrich,
but merely we examine the wealth inequality amongst those very wealthy individuals.
In sum, we examine the same issue from a different angle. We study if inequality
amongst the very wealthiest also increases with corruption, that is, are there amongst the
richest only a few with perhaps excessive fortune? Indeed, it is usually found that cor-
ruption leads to more inequality, but does this also hold for the very rich?
Following the literature, we include in our empirical econometric model also measures
of competition and GDP, as these may also influence inequality. And, to overcome en-
dogeneity issues, we also consider a panel model where we only include the one-year
lagged data on the explanatory variables. Various versions of our panel model all lead to
one and the same conclusion, and that is that is not corruption that drives inequality
amongst the wealthiest but it is competitiveness. The least competitive is a country the
larger is the difference in wealth amongst the superrich. To check for potential con-
founding effects, at the same time we show that the measures on competitiveness and
corruption do not correlate much.
In Sect. 2 we outline the construction of the database, and in Sect. 3 we present the
estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
We start with the data on inequality amongst the superrich. For this, we consult the Forbes
lists for 13 countries.1 These countries are Australia (where the list contains 40 entries),
China (400), Hong Kong (40), India (100), Indonesia (40), Japan (40), Korea (40),
Malaysia (40), the Philippines (40), Singapore (40), Taiwan (40), Thailand (40) en the
United States of America (500).
Klass et al. (2006) have shown that the Forbes ranking for the USA obeys a power law.
Using an alternative ranking for the superrich in the Netherlands, Franses en Vermeer
(2012) document similar results, and that is that the differences in wealth of those at ranks,
say, 2 and 3, is similar to the differences between ranks 3 and 4. This can be visualized by
plotting the natural logarithm of wealth against the natural logarithm of the associated
rank. Figure 1a–c show these linear links for the 2009 Forbes rankings, as an illustration.
1 http://www.forbes.com/lists/.
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For other years, similar graphs appear. The slopes of these lines (when approximated using
a linear regression model) are called alpha. Clearly, the more negative is alpha the larger
are the differences in wealth of the wealthiest. In Table 3 in the Appendix we present the
estimates of alpha for the 13 countries for 2006–2011, when available.
In the Data Appendix, we also present the data on the explanatory variables that we use
in our panel model below. The source of our corruption data is Transparency Interna-
tional.2 The numbers in our table are 10 minus the scores, where now the corruption figures
are such that higher values mean more corruption. In the literature on income inequality,
there are several explanatory factors considered, and the commonly considered variables
are a measure of competitiveness and GDP growth. The data for competitiveness are drawn
from the World Economic Forum,3 see Appendix Table 5. For GDP growth, we consult the
database of the World Bank.4 In Appendix Table 6 contains the data on this last variable.
A priori, we would expect that more corruption would lead to more inequality, also
amongst the wealthiest. At the same time, a higher level of competitiveness means that
there are more companies which survive and succeed, and this would lead to more equality,
also amongst the superrich. Finally, higher economic growth comes to the benefit of many
individuals, and, as indicated in the relevant literature, there we would expect a decreasing
effect on inequality, also for the superrich.
In Table 1 we present the correlations across the explanatory variables for each of the
countries. It is interesting to see that the correlations are usually quite small. Also, there
even seems to be no common sign of the correlations as positive and negative correlations
appear about equally frequently.
3 Empirical analysis
To link the alpha measure for inequality with the explanatory variables, we consider
versions of the following panel data model, that is
alphai;t ¼ li þ q alphai;t1 þ b1 corruptioni;t þ b2 corruptioni;t1 þ c1 competitivenessi;t
þ c2 competitivenessi;t1 þ d1GDPgrowthi;t þ d2GDPgrowthi;t1 þ ei;t
We have to set most of the parameters (except for the country-specific intercept) as
equal across the countries, in order to gain degrees of freedom. As for some countries alpha
estimates are missing, our model is an unbalanced panel model.
Some of the most relevant least-squares-based estimation results are presented in
Table 2. Other versions of the model (no lags, and no one-year lagged alpha) give
qualitatively similar outcomes. Clearly, the only variable that is relevant to explain
inequality amongst the wealthiest is the measure of competitiveness. More competition
leads to less inequality. This is a conclusion that has been drawn before and which is
reiterated here when looking only at the wealthiest individuals in 13 countries. Corruption
seems not to have much of an effect. The sign is correct though, implying that more
corruption associates with more inequality, but the estimate is not significant. Perhaps
when more data become available in the future the potential relevance of this variable can
be explored further.
2 http://www.transparency.org/.
3 http://www.weforum.org/.
4 http://data.worldbank.org/.
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4 Conclusion
We have demonstrated, and in contrast to income levels at the bottom end, that corruption
does not seem to impact inequality of wealth amongst the superrich. In fact, when such
inequalities could be reduced it could be done by increasing competitiveness. Reducing
monopolies and cartels seems a better strategy to trim down the wealth of the wealthiest.
The limitations of our study are given by the data that we use. The Forbes rankings
involve a considerable amount of judgment, and measurement errors can occur. As we do
not use the actual data but the estimated slopes in a regression model, we hope that any
measurement errors do not have too large a consequence. Similar arguments about judg-
ment can be made for the corruption data, and there we have to rely on the quality and
experience of the data compilers. A final limitation is of course that only have thirteen
countries with data, and this can be considered a small sample. Unfortunately, we are not
familiar with other Forbes rankings, so this limitation is beyond our efforts.
bFig. 1 a Scatter of the log of wealth (in billions of USD) against the log of the rank (2009 data). b Scatter of
the log of wealth (in billions of USD) against the log of the rank (2009 data). c Scatter of the log of wealth
(in billions of USD) against the log of the rank (2009 data)
Table 1 Correlations across explanatory variables
Country Corruption-
competitiveness
Corruption-GDP
growth
Competitiveness-GDP
growth
Australia 0.280 0.579 0.557
China -0.860 0.676 -0.696
Hong Kong -0.257 -0.650 0.761
India -0.038 -0.130 0.294
Indonesia -0.698 -0.016 0.449
Japan 0.125 -0.018 0.284
Korea 0.346 0.637 0.051
Malaysia -0.569 -0.246 0.493
Philippines -0.132 -0.066 0.119
Singapore -0.033 -0.685 -0.317
Taiwan -0.460 -0.366 0.198
Thailand 0.700 -0.025 0.137
USA -0.548 0.835 -0.349
Table 2 Various parameter es-
timates (with standard errors)
obtained using OLS to the un-
balanced panel data model
5 % significant parameters are in
bold and italic
Variables Full model Only lags
Alpha, lagged 0.063 (0.150) 0.128 (0.153)
Corruption -0.019 (0.071)
Corruption, lagged -0.128 (0.077) -0.112 (0.073)
Competitiveness 0.375 (0.160)
Competitiveness, lagged 0.098 (0.124) 0.250 (0.106)
GDP growth/100 0.005 (0.344)
GDP growth/100, lagged 0.028 (0.363) 0.343 (0.329)
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Appendix
See Appendix Tables 3, 4, 5, 6.
Table 3 The data on alpha (estimated using linear regressions, rounded at three digits)
Country Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia -0.760 -0.756 -0.759 -0.707 -0.651 -0.813
China -0.659 -0.790 -0.580 -0.631 -0.599 -0.573
Hong Kong -1.025 -0.987 -0.947 -0.948
India -1.027 -1.139 -1.063 -1.053 -1.012 -1.001
Indonesia -1.093 -1.399 -1.065 -0.935 -0.878 -0.857
Japan -0.763 -0.709 -0.789 -0.843 -0.860
Korea -0.567 -0.537 -0.618 -0.714 -0.778
Malaysia -1.430 -1.339 -1.411 -1.421 -1.468 -1.395
Philippines -1.363 -1.326 -1.244 -1.282 -1.266 -1.259
Singapore -1.278 -1.119 -1.167 -1.194 -1.173 -1.116
Taiwan -0.775 -0.687 -0.726 -0.663
Thailand -1.145 -0.962 -1.114 -1.125 -1.133 -1.125
USA -0.723 -0.703 -0.720 -0.736 -0.742 -0.764
Table 4 The data of corruption
Country Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2
China 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.4
Hong Kong 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6
India 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.9
Indonesia 7.6 7.7 7.4 7.2 7.2 7.0
Japan 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.0
Korea 4.9 4.9 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6
Malaysia 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.5 5.6 5.7
Philippines 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.4
Singapore 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8
Taiwan 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.2 3.9
Thailand 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.4
USA 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.9
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